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LONGSHOREMEN AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION
ACT: MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE REMEDIES FOR
PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY
Potomac Electric Power Company v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, United States Department of Labor, et al., - U.S.
101 S.Ct. 569, 66 L.Ed.2d 446 (1980)
In this case,' brought under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA),2 as extended to the District of Columbia by the
District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act,3 the Supreme Court
finally settled the issue of whether a claimant with a permanent partial
disability must be satisfied with the specific compensation scheduled for his
injury, or may elect to seek a greater award based upon his lost wage-earning
capacity under the provision established for "all other cases."4 The decision in
1. Potomac Elec. Pwr. Co. v. Dir., Off. of Wkrs' Comp. Progs., United States Dept. of
Labor, et al., __ U.S. -_, 101 S.Ct. 509, 66 L.Ed.2d 446 (1980). Decided December 15,
1980, by an eight to one vote. Opinion by Justice Stevens, dissenting opinion, by Justice
Blackmun.
2. 33 U.S.C. § 901-50 (1927), as amended by Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-576, 86 Stat. 1251, et. seq. (1972).
3. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-501 to 36-504 (1973) applies the LHWCA to the District
of Columbia. See Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 469, 471 (1947).
4. Longshoremen and Harbor Workers'.Compensation Act § 8, as amended, 33
U.S.C. § 908, sets forth four separate categories of disability, each with its own distinct
formula for computing the amount of the award.
Compensation for permanent partial disability is provided for by scheduled awards
under parts (1)-(20) of§ § 8(c) and the provision for "all other cases," § § 8(c) (21). LHWCA
Section 8 provides, in part, as follows:
Compensation for disability shall be paid to the employee as follows:
(a) Permanent total disability: In case of total disability adjudged to be permanent
662/ per centum of the average weekly wages shall be paid to the employee during
the continuance of such total disability. Loss of both hands, or both arms, or both feet,
or both legs or both eyes, or of any two thereof shall, in the absence of conclusive proof
to the contrary, constitute permanent total disability. In all other cases permanent
total disability shall be determined in accordance with the facts.
(b) Temporary total disability: In case of disability total in character but temporary
in quality 662/. per centum of the average weekly wages shall be paid to the employee
during the continuance thereof.
(c) Permanent partial disability: In case of disability partial in character but
permanent in quality the compensation shall be 662/,1 per centum of the average
weekly wages, which shall be in addition to compensation for temporary total
disability or temporary partial disability paid in accordance with subdivision (b) or
(273)
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
this case signals the end of a recent trend' by the Benefits Review Board
(BRB) and United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit,' by which a permanent partially disabled claimant is allowed to seek
a greater award based on lost wage-earning capacity under the provision for
"all other cases,"8 when the compensation specified in the schedule of awards 9
is proven inadequate to fairly compensate him for his future economic losses.
By reversing the lower court's allowance of such an election of remedies, the
Court reasserted Congress' intention to limit compensation to the stated
award for injuries listed in the schedule.
I. THE FACTS
Respondent, Terry M. Cross, Jr., was working within the scope of his
employment as a cable splicer for the Potomac Electric Power Company
(PEPCO), on December 7, 1974, when he injured his left knee. Medical
subdivision (e) of this section, respectively, and shall be paid to the employee, as
follows:
(1) Arm lost, three hundred and twelve weeks' compensation.
(2) Leg lost, two hundred and eighty-eight weeks' compensation.
(19) Partial loss or partial loss of use: Compensation for permanent partial loss or
loss of use of a member may be for proportionate loss or loss of use of the member.
(21) Other cases: In all other cases in this class of disability the compensation shall
be 662/3 per centum of the difference between his average weekly wages and his
wage-earning capacity thereafter in the same employment or otherwise, payable
during the continuance of such partial disability, but subject to reconsideration of the
degree of such impairment by the deputy commissioner on his own motion or upon
• ..application of any party in interest.
(e) Temporary partial disability: In case of temporary partial disability resulting in
decrease of earning capacity the compensation shall be two-thirds of the difference
between the injured employee's average weekly wages before the injury and his
wage-earning capacity after the injury in the same or another employment, to be paid
during the continuance of such disability, but shall not be paid for a period exceeding
five year.
5. See infra note 62.
6. The Benefits Review Board is a three member commission created by Section
21 of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 921, to review decisions of the Administrative Law
Judge in cases arising under the Act. Decisions by the Board are final unless appealed
within sixty days of a final decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
circuit in which the injury occurred.
7. PEPCO v. Dir. Off. of Wkrs. Comp. Prog., 606 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
8. LHWCA § § 8(c)(21) supra note 4, establishes compensation awards on the
basis of post-injury loss of wage-earning capacity.
9. LHWCA § § 8(c)(1)-(20) supra note 4.
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testimony established that he had sustained a five to twenty percent
permanent partial loss of the use of his leg.'" Prior to the injury, Cross'
annual earnings amounted to $21,959.38 including overtime pay of
$8,543.30.'1 After his return to work on a light-duty status, Cross found that
he was not allowed to work overtime, and was not granted the routine
in-grade raises afforded to other cable-splicers. These developments resulted
in a forty percent impairment of his earning capacity."
Throughout the case, the Petitioner (PEPCO) argued that compensation
due to Cross was limited by statute to that amount payable under
Subsections 8(c)(2) and (19) of the LHWCA.' 3 Under those sections of the Act,
Petitioner would be strictly liable to award Cross amounts equal to
two-thirds of his average weekly pre-injury wages for a maximum of 288
weeks, the exact duration to be proportionate to the percentage of loss of use
of his leg."
Respondent Cross asserted that an award provided under schedule
Subsections 8(c)(2) and (19) would be disproportionately low to accomplish
the remedial and humanitarian objectives of the Act.'5 Since he could prove a
loss in wage-earning capacity resulting in economic damage far in excess of a
schedule award,' 6 Cross argued that he had the right to elect either the
10. 101 S.Ct. at 511; see also 606 F.2d at 1326.
11. Id.
12. Cross' 1975 earnings amounted to $12,86.48. 101 S.Ct. at 511 n.2. After re-
turning to work, Cross was unable to climb ladders or perform other strenuous chores
normal to a cable-splicer's job, due to his injury. See 606 F.2d at 1325. While PEPCO
continued to list Cross as a Class A cable splicer, he was given light work such as
caring for warehouse equipment and inspecting trucks. See Cross v. PEPCO, 7 BRBS
10, 11 (1977).
13. See supra note 4.
14. Subsection 8(c)(2) provides maximum benefits of two-thirds the average week-
ly pre-injury wages for total loss of a leg, payable each week for 288 weeks. Subsection
8(c)(19) provides that the number of weeks' benefits payable for partial loss of a leg
shall be proportionate to the percentage loss of the leg. Thus, Cross is entitled to re-
ceive two-thirds of his average weekly pre-injury wages for that portion of 288 weeks
which is proportionate to the percentage loss of use of his leg. Since the case was
decided below under § § 8(c)(21), the percentage of loss was not conclusively estab-
lished, but medical testimony estimated it as being between five and twenty percent.
See 101 S.Ct. at 511 n. 4.
15. See Cross v. PEPCO, 7 BRBS 10, 12 (1977).
16. Cross' average weekly wage was determined by the AI. to be $332.48 per
week. Utilizing § § 8(c)(2), (19) and the maximum loss of twenty percent, under the
schedule Cross could receive at most, benefits of $332.48 x 2/, x 288 x 20% =
$12,767.23; the least he could receive under the schedule would be $332.48 x 2/, x 288 x
5% = $3,191.81. 101 S.Ct. at 519 n. 2, 3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The ALA below
determined Cross' lost wage-earning capacity to be $130.13 per week. Benefits calcu-
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scheduled award under Subsections 8(c)(2) and (19), or benefits under
Subsection 8(c)(21), by which he could receive an amount equal to two-thirds
of his lost wage-earning capacity,'" each week, for the rest of his working
life.'"
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) adopted claimant's argument,
determined his lost wage-earning capacity to amount to $130 per week,'9 and
awarded Cross two-thirds of that amount, payable each week, for the
remainder of his working life."0 On subsequent appeals taken by PEPCO, the
Benefits Review Board and Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the decision of the ALJ,2' whereupon, the Supreme Court
granted PEPCO's Writ of Certiorari.22
lated under § § 8(c)(21) amounted to $130.13 x 2 = $86.76 per week, or about $4,500
per year for the rest of his working life. 101 S.Ct. at 518-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In summation, Cross could expect to receive a total award of approximately
$3,200 to $12,800 under the schedule, or $86.76 per week for the rest of his working life
under the provision for "all other cases," which could easily exceed a total recovery of
$100,000. 101 S.Ct. at 517 n. 25. Respondent Cross had much to gain by preserving his
award under § § 8(c)(21).
17. "Wage-earning capacity" for purposes of § § 8(c)(21) is determined by § 8(h) of
the Act. This amount is not necessarily based upon a claimant's actual post-injury
earnings, but may be fixed at a reasonable amount, in the interest of justice, where the
employee has no actual post-injury earnings, or the earnings are unreasonably high -
not fairly representing his actual impaired wage-earning capacity. 33 U.S.C. § 908(h);
see also 101 S.Ct. at 511 n. 5.
18. See supra note 16.
19. 101 S.Ct. at 512.
This figure was arrived at by determining the amount of the base pay increases
that Cross was denied after the injury and the amount of overtime pay lost due to
the injury. The latter amount was based on the ratio of overtime to base earnings
for 1972, 1973 and 1974.
606 F.2d at 1326 n. 4.
20. Adopting the theory of election of remedies under § 8(c) and awarding benefits
in accordance with § 8(c)(21).
21. 7 BRBS 10 (1977); 606 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Both the BRB and Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit determined that Cross had a right to seek benefits based
on lost wage-earning capacity under § 8(c)(21). In both appeals, the reveiwing bodies
gave deference to § 21(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(b), which provides, "The findings of
fact in the decision under review by the Board shall be conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole." Based upon this standard of
review and a finding of an election of remedies between the schedule awards and
§ § 8(c)(21), the BRB and Court of Appeals both affirmed after finding the decision of
the AU was supported by "substantial evidence." See 606 F.2d at 1326; 7 BRBS at 11.
Therefore, a determination of Cross' actual precentage loss of use of his leg was un-
necessary to compute damages. 101 S.Ct. at 511 n. 4.
22. No. 79-816, cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (Feb. 19. 1980).
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I. RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT
Before the Supreme Court, Respondent rested his contention that
Subsection 8(c)(21) provided an alternate remedial avenue to the scheduled
awards upon three major premises. First, Respondent argued that under
circumstances where the claimant can prove greater economic injury through
lost wage-earning capacity than the amount he could recover under the
scheduled benefits, limitation to the schedule as the exclusive formula for
compensation is inconsistent with the humanitarian and remedial purposes
for which the Act was adopted.23 Such limitation does not follow the judicial
mandate that such laws "are deemed to be in the public interest and should
be construed liberally in furtherance of the purpose for which they were
enacted and, if possible, [sic] so as to avoid incongruous or harsh results.""' In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun elaborated on the harshness of a
scheduled award which could yield Cross a total award of between $3,200 and
$12,800,11 compared to the award under Subsection 8(c)(21) of approximately
$4,500 per year for as long as Cross continues to work.26
Respondent's second argument was that Subsection 2(10) of the Act 7 and
the decision in American Mutual Life Insurance Co. .v. Jones," describe
23. 101 S.Ct. at 512, citing, 606 F.2d at 1327-28.
24. 101 S.Ct. at 516 n. 22; 606 F.2d at 1327, Citing Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328,
333 (1953); Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414
(1932). See also 101 S.Ct. at 518 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. The actual amount depending upon the final determination of percentage of
lost use of Cross' leg between five and twenty percent. See supra note 14.
26. See supra note 16. Justice Blackmun also indicated that limitation of remedy
for permanent partial disability to the schedule award would lead to the anomalous
result that Cross could collect greater benefits for a temporary partial disability under
§ 8(e) which would have provided two-thirds of his lost wage-earning capacity each
week for a maximum of five years ($86 per week for five years), totalling $22,400 in
benefits, vice the maximum scheduled benefits of $12,800. 101 S.Ct. at 521 n. 9.
27. LHWCA Section 2(10) defines "disability" as "incapacity because of injury to
earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or
any other employment." 33 U.S.C. § 902(10).
28. American Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 426 F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Jones
involved a claim by a sixty-three year old laborer, "barely above a moron" in intellig-
nece, who lost the use of his right hand. The Court found he was not limited to a
scheduled award for permanent partial disability after it determined that "disability"
is an economic rather than a medical concept, requiring factors such as the claimant's
age, his industrial history, and the availability of the type work he could perform to be
taken into consideration. After weighing these facts, the court elevated his disability
from permanent partial to permanent total disability, and awarded him compensation
based on lost wage-earning capacity under § 8(a) of the Act.
The Court correctly distinguished Jones and any effect it may have on an
election of remedies under § 8(c) by indicating the separate schemes provided for com-
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"disability" as an economic, rather than a medical concept, thus tying the
claimant's disability directly to his loss in wage-earning capacity. " This
interpretation was central to Respondent's presumption that while Congress
has conclusively established the existence of lost wage-earning capacity and
mandated specific minimum awards under Subsections 8(c)(1)-(20),
claimants who elect to bear the burden of proving actual lost wage-earning
capacity in excess of the scheduled awards, should be allowed to seek greater
permanent partial disability compensation under the "all other cases"
language of Subsection 8(c)(21).11 To support this contention, Respondent
cited what he saw as a consistent concurring interpretation by the Benefits
Review Board."2
Finally, Respondent asserted that the recent trend in workman's
compensation law is "away from the idea of exclusivity of scheduled
benefits,"33 and that a limitation to scheduled benefits would create a work
disincentive. Permanent partially disabled workers who are unable to return
to their jobs may be disinclined to accept lower-paying jobs in other
employment, because such action would limit them to scheduled benefits. By
remaining unemployed, they may seek higher compensation by pressing for a
determination of permanent total disability which would pay them two-thirds
of their average weekly wages for the rest of their lives."
puting benefits under each type of disability, thereby making the § 8(c) schedule
irrelevant to a case taken out of § 8(c) and decided under § 8(a). See 101 S.Ct. at 514 n.
17; see also 606 F.2d at 1340 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
29. See 101 S. Ct. at 514 n. 17; 606 F.2d at 1328.
30. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d 137, 143-44 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 913 (1955).
31. See supra note 4.
32. See infra note 62.
33. 101 S.Ct. at 515; 606 F.2d at 1328-29, citing 2 A. Larson, TIlE LAW OF WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION, § 58.20 at 10-212 to 10-214 (1976). The trend alluded to by Pro-
fessor Larson in his treatise is based upon a study of state cases brought under diver-
gent statutes. "[lit can be said that at one time the doctrine of exclusiveness of schedule
allowances did dominate the field. But in recent years there has developed such a
strong trend in the opposite direction that one might now, with equal justification, say
that the field is dominated by the view that schedule allowances should not be deemed
exclusive ..." Id.
34. See LHWCA § 8(a) supra note 4. See 101 S.Ct. at 521 n. 9 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
In Mason v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., I BRBS 357, 365 (1975), the
BRB determined that a permanent partially disabled longshoreman, who was unable to
return to his job because of his injury, but who made a meager living by selling water-
melons and fish as a street vendor, should receive a seventy-five percent permanent
partial disability as awarded by the ALJ under Section 8(c)(21), in lieu of a scheduled
award. The Board found that to limit Mason to a scheduled award would be unjust
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III. THE MERITS
In rejecting Respondent's arguments, and reversing in favor of PEPCO
and an exclusive remedy under the scheduled awards, the Supreme Court
relied on four bases of support. First, the construction of statutory remedies
under the LHWCA does not support a separate remedy for permanent partial
disability under Subsection 8(c)(21). 5 The Court emphasized that the "all
other cases" language of Subsection 8(c)(21) refers only to those injuries
causing permanent partial disability for which the schedule does not provide
a specific award. 6 The plain meaning was that the subsection was to act as a
catch-all for the numerous conceivable injuries that Congress could not
foresee, and not to provide alternative ..relief for-claimants who are
disenchanted with the scheduled awards."7 The Court noted that in the
prefatory language to Section 8, Congress dictated that "Compensation for
disability shall be paid to the employee as follows. . . [emphasis supplied].138
The Court did not read this mandate and the "all other cases" language of
Subsection 8(c)(21) as authorizing an election of remedies. 9
Secondly, the Court found support for its ruling in the legislative history
of the LHWCA.4° The main thrust of the Court's finding was based upon the
holding of Sokolowski v. Bank of America," which interpreted the same
controversial provision in the New York Workman's Compensation Act of
1922, upon which the LHWCA was patterned." In Sokolowski, the New York
because "Were it not for the claimant's unaided efforts he could well be considered
permanently totally disabled," and limitation to a scheduled award "would have the
effect of dissuading efforts on the part of an injured claimant to rehabilitate himself,"
encouraging him instead, to remain unemployed and pursue greater compensation
through a claim for permanent total disability. See also Brandt, infra note 62, at 701-
02.
35. See 101 S.Ct. at 512-13.
36. In his dissenting opinion below, Judge MacKinnon noted that the schedule is
concerned primarily with common industrial injuries to arms, hands, legs, etc. Other
conceivable injuries were left by Congress to be compensated under the Section 8(c)
(21) catch-all provision for "all other cases." Such injuries include mental disorders,
hernias, heart attacks, and back injuries. "[Tihe existence of two avenues of compensa-
tion does not necessarily mean that claimants have a choice between the two." 606 F.2d
at 1332.
37. See Williams v. Donovan, infra note 58 at 138.
38. See supra note 4.
39. The Court noted that the "other cases" language appears twice in § § 8(c)(21).
101 S.Ct. at 512.
40. See 101 S.Ct. at 513 (Part II).
41. Sokolowski v. Bank of America, 261 N.Y. 57, 184 N.E. 492 (1933).
42. N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1922, c. 615, § 15(3).
"The schedule adopted by Congress in the LHWCA was substantially identical
to the New York schedule of 1922. Congress selected the New York statute as the
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Court of Appeals found the statute clear on its face, that "the phrase 'in all
other cases' signifies that the provisions of the paragraph [Subsection
8(c)(21)] shall apply only in cases where the injuries received are not confined
to a specific member or specific members."43 In its reference to legislative
history, the Court placed all its emphasis on the interpretation of the similar
New York statute and literally disgarded a wealth of enlightening Congres-
sional legislative history concerning the adoption and revision of the
LHWCA itself. This history, which was discussed at length by Judge
MacKinnon in his dissenting opinion of the circuit court's decision below,"
exposed Congress' intention, through its construction of Section 8(c), to avoid
costly and time-consuming determinations of injury awards in cases involv-
ing the most common industrial injuries. By scheduling awards in Subsec-
tions 8(c)(1)-(20), Congress created a conclusive presumption of the amount
of benefits due,45 while fitting "all other cases" in the conceivable realm of
injuries, into the catch-all provision, Subsection 8(c)(21), by which awards
would be determined on the basis of lost wage-earning capacity.46 While the
Court agreed that "the legislative history supported the view that the
schedule and 'all other cases' categories were intended to be mutually
exclusive," it relegated this strong support to notice in a single footnote.
The Court also passed summarily over the support offered by Congres-
sional debate of the proposed 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA.6 The
model for the LHWCA because that statute was considered one of the best workman's
compensation laws of its time." 101 S.Ct. at 513 n. 13.
43. 261 N.Y. 57, 62, 184 N. E. 492, 494.
44. See 606 F.2d at 1329-40.
45. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, supra note 30, at 144.
46. See supra note 4.
47. 101 S.Ct. at 513 n. 11.
Although no "clear answer" could be found in the legislative history examined
by Judge MacKinnon, it seems that legislative history rarely does give on-point
answers to disputed issues over statutory construction. The Court does agree with
Judge MacKinnon's finding that to the extent any conclusion can be drawn, the legisla-
tive history of the LHWCA "exhibits Congress' understanding that the 'other cases'
provision is confined to disabilities based on injuries not mentioned in the schedule."
606 F.2d at 1341. It is questionable why the Court did not place more reliance upon
these conclusions drawn from the legislative history which is usually the best means of
retrospectively ascertaining Congressional intent.
48. The proposed amendment is discussed at length by both Judge MacKinnon in
his dissent below, 606 F.2d at 1334-35, and by Chairman Smith in his lengthy dissent
to the BRB's decision in Collins v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 9 BRBS 1015, 1026-36
(1979). The proposed amendment would have added the following paragraph to § § 8(c):
(23) With respect to any period after payments under paragraph (c) (1) through
(c) (20) have terminated, compensation shall be paid as provided in subsections (a)
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proposed amendments would have recognized the exclusivity of the scheduled
provisions and Subsection 8(c)(21), but would have allowed claimants to seek
additional compensation based upon lost wage-earning capacity at the
conclusion of benefits under a scheduled award." Such an amendment to the
LHWCA would have been similar in scope and effect to amendments adopted
by Congress to the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) in 1966. °
The latter amendment provided for "compensation based on lost wage-
earning capacity after the scheduled award had been paid out."5 While this
change was adopted by Congress for FECA in 1966, its passage was refused
for the LHWCA in 1972. As a non-federal worker, Respondent Cross was
limited to the scheduled awards of the LHWCA.5 2 Once again, in a single
footnote, the Court dismissed the import of the proposed 1972 amendment as
having only "marginal relevance," since it would have authorized cumula-
and (b) of this section if the disability is total, or, if the disability is partial, 662/,
per centum of the difference between the injured employee's average weekly
wages before the injury and his wage-earning capacity after the injury in the
same or other employment.
S. 2318 and H.R. 12006, 92d CONG., 2d SESS. § 7 (1972). During Senate Hearings, one
commentator stated:
Section 8(c)(21) of the Act, commonly referred to as the "other cases" provision,
provides for benefit payments at two thirds of the employee's average weekly
wage prior to the occurrence, but not in excess of the maximum rate, for disability
which does not come within the schedule provisions of the Act (Section 8(c)(1)
through 8(c)(20)), but which impairs an employee's earning capacity. The intent of
the proposed amendment is to apply this concept to all schedule award cases after
the expiration of any such award.
Proposed Amendments to the LHWCA: Hearings on S. 2318 Before the Subcommittee
on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d CONG., 2d SESS.
183-84 (1972) (statement of Ralph Hartman).
49. Id.
50. 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et. seq. (1916), as amended by Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-554, 80 Stat. 536.
5 U.S.C. § 8107 provides a schedule of awards similar to that of 33 U.S.C.
§ 908(c)(1)-(20). 5 U.S.C. § 8106 provides a continuance of benefits for permanent par-
tial disability beyond the scheduled period, based upon lost wage-earning capacity.
The FECA employs a schedule of awards which "conform to the one contained
in the Longshoreman's Act." 606 F.2d at 1334, citing 95 CONG. REC. 13607 (1949)
(remarks of Sen. Douglas). Compare, 5 U.S.C. § 8107 with LHWCA § § 8(c)(1)-(20). The
FECA is likewise supervised by the same Senate and House Committees that have
jurisdiction over the LHWCA. 606 F.2d at 1335, citing S. REP. No. 1285, 89th CONG.,
2d SEss. 3 (1966). The 1966 FECA amendment, like the proposed 1972 LHWCA amend-
ment, recognized that a permanent partially disabled worker "receives no further com-
pensation after his scheduled award is exhausted." Id.
51. 606 F.2d at 1336.
52. Id.
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tive, rather than alternative remedies.53 This reasoning, however, ingnored
the discussion of the commentators in Senate Hearings.' and the language of
the House Report,55 which recognized the exclusivity of the scheduled benefits
and those for "all other cases," and which implied Congressional adoption of a
similar interpretation. 6 Satisfied with resting its major support by the
legislative history on the parallel between Sokolowski's interpretation of the
New York statute and Section 8(c) of the LHWCA, the Court allowed strong
arguments based on federal legislative history to die impotently in two
footnotes.57
The third prong of the Court's support lay in the weight of judicial
authority. This weight came in the form of a single case, Williams v.
Donovan; a case on "all fours" factually with the present case.55 In Williams,
a permanent partially disabled claimant with a knee injury, who sought
benefits based on lost wage-earning capacity, was limited to a scheduled
award, because the "form and language of the Act dictate that the
wage-earning capacity test be applied only in those 'other cases' not listed in
53. 101 S.Ct. at 513 n. 14. That the proposed amendment would have offered a
cumulative rather than alternative remedy is actually immaterial. It was the under-
standing by the legislature that the existing statute did not provide an election of
remedies, as evidenced by the debate over the proposed amendment, which was of im-
portance.
54. See Hearings on S.2318, supra note 48 and Collins, supra note 48, at 1028-31.
55. See 606 F.2d at 1334 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), citing, H.R. REP. No. 92-
1441, 92d CONG., 2d SEss. 18 (1972), U.S. CODE CONG. & AvMIN. NEWS 1972, pp. 4698,
4715.
56. See Collins supra note 48, at 1033 (Smith, chairman, dissenting in part).
57. See supra notes 47, 53.
58. Williams v. Donovan, 234 F.Supp. 135 (E.D.La. 1964); aff'd (one paragraph per
curium), 367 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 977 (1967).
A second case in which the court impliedly recognized the mutual exclusivity
of scheduled awards, and those for "all other cases" is Flamm v. Hughes, 329 F.2d 378
(2nd Cir. 1964). Flamm involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the statutory
scheme of § 8(c) of the LHWCA on grounds of "unconstitutional distinctions among
various types of injuries." Id at 380. It was argued that Section 8(c) discriminated
against those workers with scheduled injuries who were limited to scheduled awards,
while those with unscheduled injuries often received disproportionate awards under
the § § 8(c)(21) provision for "all other cases," based on lost wage-earning capacity.
While the court found the separate compensatory schemes of § 8(c) constitutional, the
"unarticulated predicate" for its decision was that the two schemes were mutually ex-
clusive as between each other; otherwise the issue would never have been raised." 606
F.2d at 1337; see also 101 S.Ct. at 514 n. 16.
59. 606 F.2d at 1336 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). In reaching its finding of an
election of remedies, the majority below rejected the reasoning of Williams, which
found no election of remedies under § 8(c) without discussing why. Id.
LONGSHOREMEN AND HARBOR WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT 283
the schedule. "I In the instant case, the Supreme Court endorsed the Williams
view, and stated the irony of the notion that the LHWCA could stand for over
fifty years before the Court of Appeals below decided that it doesn't mean
what it says.' Respondent attempted to discredit the Williams decision by
citing several cases decided by the Benefits Review Board since 1975, which
reject Williams and favor an election of remedies for permanent partial
disability.62 The Court aptly distinguished three of these cases,' but rather
than continuing with a thorough analysis of the facts of the remainder of the
cases, which certainly would have revealed their distinguishing
characteristics,' the Court simply discontinued any further analysis of the
60. 234 F.Supp. at 139.
61. 101 S.Ct. at 515; see also 606 F.2d at 1329, 1336.
62. See Collins v. Todd Shipyard Corp., 9 BRBS 1015 (1979); Brandt v. Avondale
Shipyards, 8 BRBS 698 (1978); Dugger v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 8 BRBS 552 (1978);
Richardson v. Perna & Cantrell, Inc., 6 BRBS 588 (1977); Longo v. Universal Terminal
& Stevedoring Corp., 2 BRBS 357 (1975); Mason v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 1
BRBS 357 (1975).
63. The Court correctly distinguished Mason, supra notes 34, 62; the first case in
which the Benefits Review Board approved an election of remedies under § 8(c), and
which is cited as authority for later decisions finding a similar election. Mason rejected
the Williams decision, and wrongly based its finding on American Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Jones, supra note 28, which did not address the issue of election of remedies under
Section 8(c), but merely allowed q claimant with a scheduled permanent partial dis-
ability to remove his recovery from a scheduled award under § § 8(c)(1), to an award
based on lost wage-earning capacity for a permanent total disability under Section 8(a),
by taking factors such as his age, skills, and availability of employment opportunities
into consideration. The finding in Jones was not in any way inconsistent with the
Williams holding of exclusivity of remedies under Section 8(c). 101 S.Ct. at 514 n. 17,
citing Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Dugger, 587 F.2d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 1979).
The Court distinguished Longo and Dugger, supra note 62, as cases involving
permanent total disability, thus rendering their comments regarding the election of
remedies under § 8(c) dicta. 101 S.Ct. at 514 n. 18.
64. In Richardson, supra note 62, the BRB affirmed a decision by the ALJ which
awarded the claimant compensation based on lost wage-earning capacity under
§ § 8(c)(21) for permanent partial loss of claimant's arm. The appeal to the BRB chal-
lenged only the sufficiency of the evidence, and the claimant's limitation to scheduled
benefits was not argued, nor did the Board express any reason in its opinion for allow-
ing a recovery under § § 8(c)(21). Presumably, the Board in Richardson followed the
flawed reasoning of Mason, supra notes 34, 63, and accordingly should be limited to its
own facts, or distinguished.
In Brandt, supra note 62, the BRB upheld an award under § § 8(c)(21) for the
claimant's knee injury which otherwise rated only a scheduled award. The Board
rested its finding of an election of remedies on Longo, Dugger, Richardson and Mason,
all of which have been shown to be distinguishable. See supra notes 62-64. In his
dissent, Chairman Smith expressed his opinion that Brandt should have been limited
to a scheduled award, noting that "All of the cases cited by the majority are disting-
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cited cases by stating that "It should be noted that the Benefits Review Board
is not a policy-making agency; its interpretation of the LHWCA thus is not
entitled to any special deference from the courts."65 While this notion has
been previously articulated in the lower courts,6 such an original statement
by the Supreme Court is one that should not be made lightly in view of the
potential value of the well-reasoned and scholarly opinions of the Benefits
Review Board.67 As long as the Court could have reached its conclusion by
distinguishing the BRB cases cited by the Respondent, such an unnecessarily
blanket statement may adversely affect future cases brought under the Act.
In fact, among the federal circuit courts of appeals which have addressed the
degree of deference to be accorded to BRB opinion on statutory interpreta-
tion, the circuits favoring deference equal those which have found the BRB to
be a non-policymaking agency undeserving of deference.8 This conflict
uishable." 8 BRBS at 705. A further anomaly of the Brandt case was that the claimant
actually earned more after his injury than before. In awarding compensation based on
lost wage-earning capacity under § § 8(c)(21), the Board had to remand the case for an
artificial determination of the claimant's lost wage-earning capacity "as it may extend
into the future" under § 8(h). See supra note 17.
The Board's allowance of a remedy under § § 8(c)(21) in Collins, supra note 62,
for an otherwise scheduled injury, was likewise based upon the distinguishable prece-
dent of Mason and Brandt. In his dissent to Collins, Chairman Smith engaged in a
lengthy examination of legislative history, the Williams holding, and distinguishable
precedent to reach his opinion that Congress did not intend an election of remedies
under § 8(c). See supra note 48.
65. 101 S.Ct. at 514 n. 18.
66. The Court found support in Hastings v. Earth Satellite Corp., 628 F.2d 85
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1980); and Tri-State Terminals, Inc. v. Jesse,
596 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1979); both of which cite as authority Judge Friendly's opinion
in Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 48-49 (2nd Cir. 1976), aff'd
sub. nom., Northeast Marine Term. Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
67. The decision of the Court not to afford the BRB any deference, apparently
overrules any apparent deference afforded to the Deputy Commissioner's (predecessor
to the BRB) interpretation of LHWCA Section 20, concerning jurisdiction, in Cardillo
v. Liberty Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 469, 474 (1947). "ITIhe Deputy Commissioner's find-
ings as to jurisdiction are entitled to great weight and will be rejected only where there
is apparent error. Icitation omitted], His conclusion that jurisdiction exists in this case
is supported both by the statutory provisions and by the evidence in the record." Id.
68. The First, Second, Third and Seventh Circuits are in accord with the findings
of the Supreme Court as to the lack of deference to be accorded BRB decisions. See
Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 269-70 (1st Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); 628 F.2d at 94 (emphasis supplied). The District of
Columbia Circuit, therefore acknowledges deference to BRB statutory interpretations
except as to the issue of retroactivity.
In Nacirema Operating Co. v. Oosting, 456 F.2d 956, 960 (4th Cir. 1972), the
Fourth Circuit paid deference to the interpretation of LHWCA Section 33(e) by the
Bureau of Employees' Compensation (predecessor to the BRB) and stated that "under
LONGSHOREMEN AND HARBOR WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT 285
among the circuits, and especially the policy of the District of Columbia
Circuit,"1 should have been carefully examined before the Court proclaimed
its unnecessary conclusion on the issue of deference to BRB decisions. By
statute,"0 the Board occupies a position similar to that of the federal district
courts. Unless directly appealed to the appropriate circuit court of appeals,
the Board's decisions are final." By disregarding the opinions of the BRB, 2
the Court acted prematurely, terminating a valuable source of statutory
interpretation by those most familiar with the administration of the
LHWCA. 3
settled principles of law, we cannot lightly put aside the agency's consistent interpreta-
tion of the Act." Id. In his dissenting opinion to I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. B.R.B., etc.,
529 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (4th Cir. 1975), modified en banc, 542 F.2d 903 (1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977) (decided on other grounds), Judge Craven restated this
standard of deference to statutory interpretation by the BRB.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the analysis of Pittston, supra note 166, and
afforded deference to the BRB in Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Co. v. Kininess,
554 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977), stating that "While the
issues of statutory construction presented on this appeal do not fall within the pre-
sumption of the Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 920(a), [citation omittedl, the resolution of those
issues by the [BRB] is to be affirmed if a reasonable legal basis supports the Board's
conclusions. Id.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit paid deference to the BRB's interpretation of 33
U.S.C. § 910(c). "And in reviewing rulings of the BRB, which affirmed the ALJ here,
this court generally must defer to the Board both in its fact-finding capacity [citations
omitted] and in its role as interpreter of the Act." Nat. Steel and Shipbuilding Co. v.
Bonner, 600 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 1979).
It should, therefore, be obvious that the deference afforded to the BRB's statu-
tory interpretations was an issue of controversy between various circuits. The Court
owed a more thorough explanation of its decision to deny the BRB deference than it
afforded in a single footnote, especially where such a declaration was not necessary to
deciding this case, and where the policy of deference to BRB decisions previously
observed by the District of Columbia Circuit has thus been overruled.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 6.
71. Id. See also 606 F.2d at 1329 n. 33; Dir. Off. Wkrs. Comp. v. Eastern Coal Co.,
561 F.2d 632, 649 (6th Cir. 1977).
72. BRB opinions have received greater recognition since the inception of their
unofficial reporting in the BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD SERVIC(E published by Matthew Ben-
der since 1975. See Northeast Marine Term. Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 254 n. 3
(1976).
73. See 613 F.2d at 980, supra note 68. Dir. Off. Wkrs. Comp. v. O'Keefe, 545 F.2d
337 (3rd Cir. 1976); see also Pittston (2nd Cir.) and Tri-State (7th Cir.), supra note 66.
However, the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits all en-
dorsed a standard of great deference to statutory interpretations by the BRB.
In the District of Columbia Circuit, it is clear that statutory interpretation by
the BRB has been entitled deference by the court:
The Second Circuit in Pittston Icitation omitted I suggested that decisions of the
Benefits Review Board on the coverage of the LHWCA are not entitled to much
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Respondent's reliance on the "recent trend in workman's compensation
law away from the idea of exclusivity of scheduled benefits," was given great
weight by the circuit court below.'4 lowever, the Supreme Court counter-
vailed Respondents' argument by citing to the very treatise relied upon by
Respondents for support. 75 The Court cited passages that describe the trend
toward an election of remedies as neither uniform nor exactly on point with
this type of permanent partial disability case. 7 The Court subtly indicated
that the existence of such a state-law trend actually supported a literal
reading of the federal law.7' The fact that newer state laws alter the
traditionally scheduled awards by permitting an election of remedies only
tends to prove that the fifty-four year old LHWCA, without major revision
since its adoption, still follows the traditional limitation of scheduled
compensation. 9 Finally, the Court disposed of the trend argument by
emphasizing that its judicial role was to ascertain Congressional intent in
adopting the LHWCA in 1927, not to read changes into the Act because of
pressure brought by recent state law policies.
7
1
deference from the courts [citation omitted. At least in cases regarding the reach
of the D.C. Act, we cannot agree. It would be a poor use of judicial resources for
this court to decide for itself whether in each occurring permutation ofjurisdiction-
al facts the case is sufficiently related to the District of Columbia to fall within the
Act. This we leave to the Board, which is more familiar with the range of factual
situations. We will not upset the Board's determinations lightly.
Dir. Off. Wkrs. Comp. v. Nat. Van Lines, Inc., 613 F.2d 972, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S.Ct. 3049 (1980) (interpreting 33 U.S.C. § 920(a)) (emphasis supplied).
While the Supreme Court cites Hastings, supra note 66, as authority for its finding of
non-deference, a close reading of that case reveals that it was only concerning the issue
of retroactive repeal of a statute (LHWCA § 14(m)), to which the BRB was not given
deference.
We acknowledge the numerous Board decisions holding that the repeal of Section
14(m) is not retroactive [citation omittedI. Courts will defer to great extent to a
policymaking agency's construction of legislation pertaining to that agency. The
Benefits Review Board, however, is not a policymaking agency in this sense. The
Board's opinion on the retroactivity issue thus is not entitled to our deference. The
Board's view accordingly must fail in light of our analysis. Ifootnotes omittedl.
74. See supra note 33.
75. Id.
76. See 101 S.Ct. at 515 n. 19-21, citing, 2 A. Larson supra note 33, at § 58.00, p.
10-164; § 58.13, p. 10-174; § 58.20, pp. 10-206 to 10-212; E. Blair, REFERENI.E GuIDE
To WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 11:07, p. 11-24 (1974); 11 W. Schneider, WoRk-
MEN'S COMPENSATION § 2322(a), pp. 562-65 (1957).
77. See 101 S.Ct. at 515.
78. Id.
79. Id. "Assuming for argument the trend had some application here, it is no sub-
stitute for legislation. We do not owe our allegiance to the latest fad, but to Congres-
sional intent. Thus whatever the current rage may be, it supplies no warrant for ignor-
ing the language of the statute." 606 F.2d at 1341 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
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Finally, the Court directed itself toward countering Respondent's asser-
tion that the Act should be liberally construed in order to effectuate its
remedial purposes and to avoid harsh or incongruous results.' The Court
responded with a discussion of the basic theory of workman's compensation
law.' While imposing strict liability upon employers, workman's compensa-
tion statutes do not completely restore injured workers to their previous
economic condition. The Court reminded Respondents that the LHWCA
represents a compromise between the competing interests of employers and
injured workers," and that because of the character of the legislation and the
compelling language of the statute itself,' it is impossible to avoid all harsh
or incongruous results.'
IV. CONCLUSION
In Potomac Electric Power Company, the Supreme Court restricted a
seriously permanent partially disabled worker to scheduled benefits which
will not fully compensate him for his lost wage-earning capacity. While the
holding of the case may seem harsh, the Court must be applauded for not
engaging in judicial legislation in order to find a "just" result by ignoring or
rewriting statutory language.5 However, the Court's unnecessary and poorly
explained announcement of a policy of non-deference toward statutory
interpretation by the Benefits Review Board will surely have. a significant
impact upon future litigation under the LHWCA. As a parting gesture of its
own dissatisfaction with the award in this case under the contested statutory
provision, the Court announced its sympathy for Cross' predicament, and
80. See supra note 24.
81. See 101 S.Ct. at 516.
82. Id. at n. 24.
83. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, supra note 24 at 412-13,
mandates that "Nothing less than compelling language" would justify a construction of
the Act which would lead to unfair or incongruous results. In the present case, the
Court found such compelling language in Section 8(c).
84. Professor Larson pointed out the trade-off Congress achieved between fair
compensation and time-consuming litigation of compensation claims for common in-
dustrial injuries. "To avoid this protracted administrative task, the apparently cold-
blooded system of putting average-price tags on arms, legs, eyes, and fingers has been
devised." 2 A. Larson, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 58.11 at 10-168.
85. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun seems to have attempted to justify
a "fair" result by any means possible. He implied that as long as it was "possible to
construe the statute to allow a claimant seeking compensation for permanent partial
disability to choose between the schedule and the provisions of § 908(c)(21)," such a
construction should be adopted "so as to avoid the amazingly incongruous result ap-
plied by the Court." 101 S.Ct. at 521.
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sent a message to those who create the laws, that "It would obviously be
sound policy for Congress to re-examine the schedule of permanent partial
disability benefits more frequently than every half-century." 6 With such a
suggestion, the writer must heartily concur.
Stephen F. White
86. 101 S.Ct. at 517-18.
